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CASE NOTES
Labor Law-APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES BETWEEN EMPLOYER
AND UNION-THE SUPREME COURT'S RECESSION FROM "THE Gov-
ERNING PRINCIPLE"-Bowen v. United States Postal Service, -
U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983)
I. INTRODUCTION
After sixteen years of questionable development in the hands of
the United States Supreme Court, the concept of apportionment of
damages between employer and union has finally achieved some
measure of rational clarification in Bowen v. United States Postal
Service.' Since 1967, the federal courts have taken a number of
approaches to the principle which was first enunciated in Vaca v.
Sipes.' Ostensibly, the principle was intended to be a simple one.
In an employee's suit against both his employer and his
union-where the.employer had violated the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement, and the union had breached its duty of fair
representation-liability would be apportioned between codefend-
ants according to fault. As Justice White had written in Vaca:
The governing principle, then, is to apportion liability between
the employer and the union according to the damage caused by
the fault of each. Thus, damages attributable solely to the em-
ployer's breach of contract should not be charged to the union,
but increases if any in those damages caused by the union's re-
fusal to process the grievance should not be charged to the
employer.'
However, the facial simplicity of Vaca's "governing principle" is
misleading, particularly when one considers the variety of interpre-
tations that have been handed down by the lower courts in the
wake of that ruling.4 The Vaca decision involved much more than
1. - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983).
2. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
3. Id. at 197-98.
4. As one commentator has pointed out: "The lower courts [have not been] afforded the
luxury of ignoring as practical and important a question as the proper application of the
Vaca apportionment standard." As a result, "lower courts have assessed all damages against
the employer, assessed all damages against the union, and assessed damages jointly against
both." Linsey, The Apportionment of Liability for Damages Between Employer and Union
in § 301 Actions Involving a Union's Breach of Its Duty of Fair Representation, 30 MER-
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the mere apportionment of damages between two wrongdoers in a
contract or tort action-indeed, the principle quoted above was
handed down as a relative afterthought in the closing paragraphs
of the opinion. The central thrust of Vaca and its progeny, rather,
was to focus on the balance of interests between the employee and
his employer and his union under the terms of the collective bar-
gaining agreement. As a remedial measure designed to reinforce
the goals of federal labor policies, the principle of apportionment
of damages has necessarily reflected much of the Court's attitude
in its approach to labor relationships. The underlying rationale of
that approach has not always followed convincingly from the lan-
guage it has claimed to support.
In reality, and despite the Court's explicit emphasis on appor-
tionment, the Vaca rationale had imposed exclusive liability on the
employer for all of the employee's lost wages accruing from the
time of his wrongful discharge.6 The union's liability, on the other
hand, had been limited solely to the expenses of litigation incurred
by the employee as a result of being forced into court by the
union's breach of its duty of fair representation.' If this was indeed
a determination of liability "according to the damage caused by
the fault of each,"' then it was also grounded in a concept of
"fault" which had been predetermined by the Supreme Court, and
which bordered on strict liability for the employer.8
In Bowen, however, through the use of a hypothetical arbitration
date at which the employee would have been reinstated had the
union properly processed his grievance, 9 the Court has restructured
the apportionment of damages in such a manner as to hold the
union responsible for the additional backpay the employee would
have earned but for the union's breach of duty.10 The Court, in
essence, has turned Vaca's "governing principle" on its head with-
out changing so much as a word of its original language.
CER L. REv. 661, 672-73 (1979) (footnotes omitted).
This note will deal exclusively with decisions of the United States Supreme Court. For
discussions of the Vaca standard as applied in the lower courts, as well as of the develop-
ment of the standard itself, see id. at 670-78, and Martucci, Employer Liability for Union
Unfair Representation: The Judicial Predilection and Underlying Policy Considerations,
46 Mo. L. REv. 78, 95-100, 104-12 (1981).
5. See, e.g., Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 642 F.2d 79, 82 (4th Cir. 1981), rev'd,
103 S. Ct. 588 (1983).
6. Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25, 29 (1970).
7. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 197.
8. See Martucci, supra note 4, at 114-15.
9. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
10. Bowen, 103 S. Ct. at 595.
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This note will provide a brief overview of the section 301/fair
representation suits under which the "governing principle" arose,
and will trace the Supreme Court's development of that principle
from its inception in Vaca to its apparent demise in Bowen.
II. ORIGINS OF LIABILITY
The procedural and substantive mechanics of the type of suit
under discussion have developed in measured stages over the bet-
ter part of the last four decades. When viewed against the overall
complexities of American labor law, of course, the remedial issues
which have been resolved in Bowen are merely a small part of a
much larger concern-the resolution of employee grievances in the
courts when internal grievance procedures have failed their pur-
pose. In quite another sense, however, Bowen represents a welcome
conclusion to an important segment of the Court's ongoing struggle
to accommodate the competing interests in disputes between the
parties to a bargaining agreement. For the purpose of this discus-
sion, then, a brief outline of the sources of liability of union and
employer is necessary to fully appreciate the rationale which sup-
ports the Court's decision in Bowen.
A. The Duty of Fair Representation
The idea of a union's duty of fair representation was first articu-
lated by the Court in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad."
Steele, a black employee of the railroad, brought suit against both
his employer and the union over a discriminatory hiring agree-
ment. The Alabama Supreme Court ruled that, under the Railway
Labor Act (RLA),12 the union was under no duty whatsoever to
preserve the rights of the craft's minority members, despite the
fact that the RLA conferred exclusive authority on the union to
represent the employees in their dealings with the railroad.' 3 In
fact, such an interpretation was technically correct. Neither the
RLA nor, for that matter, the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA)14 contained any express language which established such a
duty.
Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court held that such
power could not be conferred on the union without imposing a re-
11. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
12. Ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (current version at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976)).
13. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 16 So. 2d 416 (Ala.), rev'd, 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
14. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976)).
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ciprocal duty to represent all of the members of a craft "without
hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith. ' 15 To
hold otherwise, said the Court, would serve only to contravene the
purpose of the RLA, which was, in short, to avoid commercial and
industrial strife by encouraging the prompt and orderly settlement
of labor disputes.16 Little would be accomplished, wrote Justice
Stone, if the interests of the minority were ignored at the bargain-
ing table. "The only recourse of the minority would be to strike,
with the attendant interruption of commerce, which the Act seeks
to avoid. '17 The intent of Congress in passing the Act, therefore,
could not have been to bestow such power on a union without im-
posing on it any obligation to protect the interests of those it rep-
resented.18 Thus, the statutory grant of a union's authority carried
with it the corresponding "statutory" duty of fair representation,
and would be subject "to the usual judicial remedies of injunction
and award of damages" in the event of a union's breach. 19
Steele and its companion case, Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Loco-
motive Firemen,20 dealt primarily with the issue of racial discrimi-
nation as it had arisen under the framework of the RLA. However,
another ruling issued on the same day, Wallace Corp. v. NLRB,
made reference to the duty by way of dictum, and signaled that
the Court did not intend to restrict the application of the duty
solely to circumstances involving racial discrimination. 2
When the Court finally moved to consider the scope of the duty
in an area other than racial discrimination, the result was an opin-
ion which served to broaden the union's discretion rather than its
responsibilities. In 1953, the Court held in Ford Motor Co. v.
Huff man23 that, just as the union's statutory authority was not ab-
solute, neither, accordingly, was its duty of fair representation.2" In
a suit brought under the NLRA, the plaintiff-employee had sought
injunctive relief against his employer and union over the seniority
15. Steele, 323 U.S. at 204.
16. See id. at 199-200. This general theme appears throughout many of the Court's deci-
sions in this area. See, e.g., Republic Steel v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965) (construing
Labor Management Relations Act § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976)).
17. Steele, 323 U.S. at 200.
18. Id. at 199.
19. Id. at 207. See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
20. 323 U.S. 210 (1944). Tunstall extended federal jurisdiction to cover nondiversity
suits brought by employees under the RLA.
21. 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
22. Id. at 255.
23. 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
24. Id. at 337-38.
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provisions of the bargaining agreement. The provisions in question
had operated to lower the seniority status of the plaintiff in defer-
ence to the preemployment military service of other returning vet-
erans of World War ll." The employee framed his arguments,
however, not in terms of the union's duty of fair representation,
but rather in the form of a challenge to the union's statutory au-
thority under the NLRA.2 6 Thus, while the Court's opinion focused
in a technical sense on whether the union's conduct constituted an
unfair labor practice,27 the decision nevertheless served to sketch
out the extent of discretion which a union would be afforded in its
representation of employee interests.
The Court acknowledged the existence of the union's duty as set
forth in Steele under the "comparable provisions" of the RLA,2 8
but went on to caution that any enforcement of the duty must be
kept within the bounds of reason:
Any authority to negotiate derives its principal strength from a
delegation to the negotiators of a discretion to make concessions
and accept such advantages as, in the light of all relevant consid-
erations, they believe will best serve the interests of the parties
represented .... The complete satisfaction of all who are repre-
sented is hardly to be expected. A wide range of reasonableness
must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving
the unit it represents, subject always to complete good faith and
honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion.2
Huffman and Steele, as decisions handed down during the early
stages of the development of the duty of fair representation,
shared two common characteristics. First, the plaintiff in each case
had sought relief against the employer primarily in the form of in-
junctive action.30 This was due in some measure to the nature of
the second shared feature, which was simply that the cause of ac-
tion in each case had been based on the execution and validity of
the particular bargaining agreement rather than on the defendant's
administration of its terms. As such, the employee's interests, at
25. Id. at 334-35.
26. Id. at 332.
27. Id. at 332 n.4.
28. Id. at 337 (citing Steele, 323 U.S. at 198-99).
29. Huffman, 345 U.S. at 337-38.
30. See Linsey, supra note 4, at 664. The injunctive character of relief sought against the
employers in these early cases served to forestall any opportunity for the Court to discuss
apportionment. Id. at 665.
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least as far as his employer was concerned, centered largely on en-
joining the employer from enforcing the agreement.31 However, as
the subject of these disputes shifted in later years to questions in-
volving the administration of the bargaining agreement, 2 and
finally to proceedings involving arbitration, the employer's liabil-
ity for damages under section 301 of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act '4 gradually consumed an increasing amount of the Su-
preme Court's attention.
B. Employer Liability Under Section 301
The substantive scope and intent of section 301 was addressed at
some length in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills. 5 In an
affirmative response to a union's suit to compel arbitration, the
Court held that section 301 not only granted jurisdiction to the
federal courts over labor contract disputes, but provided the courts
with a broad source of substantive law as well. "[Tihe substantive
law to apply in suits under § 301(a)," wrote Justice Douglas, "is
federal law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our
national labor laws."' 6
The suit in Lincoln Mills, of course, had been brought by the
union itself, rather than by an individual employee. Whether sec-
tion 301 would allow a suit by the latter, the Court cautioned, was
a question the case did not present.3 7
In 1962, however, the Court held that such a suit was indeed
within the coverage of the statute. In Smith v. Evening News As-
sociation,38 an employee brought suit against his employer as a re-
sult of the company's discrimination against members of the em-
ployee's union. During a strike against the company by another
union, the employer had continued to employ nonunion workers
while refusing to allow the petitioner and other members of his
union to report for work.3 9 Before Evening News, the union mem-
ber would have been required by the preemption doctrine of San
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41
(1957).
33. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
35. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
36. Id. at 456.
37. Id. at 459 n.9.
38. 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
39. Id. at 196.
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Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon0 to bring his complaint
before the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). In fact, the
petitioner's suit had been dismissed in the state courts of Michigan
on the very grounds that, as an unfair labor practice, the conduct
the petitioner alleged fell . within the NLRB's exclusive
jurisdiction."1
Writing for a majority of the Court, Justice White rejected the
employer's argument that only the union could bring suit under
section 301:
Individual claims lie at the heart of the grievance and arbitration
machinery, are to a large degree inevitably intertwined with union
interests and many times precipitate grave questions concerning
the interpretation and enforceability of the collective bargaining
contract on which they are based. To exclude these claims from
the ambit of § 301 would stultify the congressional policy of hav-
ing the administration of collective bargaining contracts accom-
plished under a uniform body of federal substantive law. This we
are unwilling to do.'
Because the contract in Evening News had contained no grievance
arbitration procedure,43 the issue of whether an employee would
have to utilize such alternatives before seeking relief under section
301 was not addressed until the Court's decision in Republic Steel
Corp. v. Maddox.4
The employee in Republic Steel had been permanently laid off
when his employer closed down a mine. Without making any at-
tempt to seek redress under the bargaining agreement's established
grievance procedure, the employee filed a court suit against his em-
ployer for the severance pay which had been promised him under
the terms of the contract.45 Pointing out that Congress had "ex-
pressly approved contract grievance procedures as a preferred
method for settling disputes and stabilizing the 'common law' of
the plant, ' 46 the Court held that an individual employee must at
40. 359 U.S. 236 (1959). The Garmon preemption doctrine stated that if a disputed ac-
tivity was "arguably" an unfair labor practice as defined by the NLRA, the courts must then
defer to the jurisdiction of the NLRB. Id. at 245. See also 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976) (defining
unfair labor practices).
41. Evening News, 371 U.S. at 196.
42. Id. at 200.
43. Id. at 196 n.1.
44. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
45. Id. at 651.
46. Id. at 653. Section 203(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act reads in relevant
1984]
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least attempt to exhaust the contract grievance procedures before
resorting to the courts for relief.47
The Republic Steel decision represents something of a turning
point in the Court's method of analyzing the interests of affected
parties. Until that decision, the relative simplicity of an employee's
suit against either his employer or his union had required little
from the Court in the way of specific-interest analysis. To be sure,
the Court's opinions in Steele and Huffman had clearly empha-
sized the interdependent relationship between a union's duty of
fair representation and the interests of the employees for whom it
bargained. Similarly, the Court in Evening News had given at least
a measure of attention to the connection between union interests
and individual claims when such claims were brought against an
employer. But Republic Steel had presented the Court with a
problem that required a further refinement of its method of analy-
sis. As mentioned earlier, the Court had avoided the necessity of
addressing the exhaustion issue in Evening News because, under
the bargaining contract, there had been no grievance procedure to
which the employee could have turned for relief. The presence of
such a procedure in Republic Steel had obliged the Court to be a
bit more discriminating in its identification of affected interests.
Examining those interests from a practical point of view, Justice
Harlan stated:
Union interest in prosecuting employee grievances is clear. Such
activity complements the union's status as exclusive bargaining
representative by permitting it to participate actively in the con-
tinuing administration of the contract. In addition, conscientious
handling of grievance claims will enhance the union's prestige
with employees.' 8
As for the employer and employee:
Employer interests, for their part, are served by limiting the
choice of remedies available to aggrieved employees. And it can-
part:
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the
desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application
or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement. The Service is di-
rected to make its conciliation and mediation services available in the settlement
of such grievance disputes only as a last resort and in exceptional cases.
29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976).
47. Republic Steel, 379 U.S. at 652.
48. Id. at 653.
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not be said, in the normal situation, that contract grievance pro-
cedures are inadequate to protect the interests of an aggrieved
employee until the employee has attempted to implement the
procedures and found them so. "
Stated differently, the preferential status of arbitration over re-
sort to the courts would continue to be the standard against which
all three subsidiary interests-those of the employee, his employer
and his union-would be measured. As long as those interests
could be easily identified and isolated as separate entities, the ap-
propriate allocation of liability could be balanced with a reasonable
degree of efficiency2 ° When those interests converged in something
more than a merely rhetorical sense, however, as they would after
Vaca, the question of the proper apportionment of liability would
arise as an altogether more demanding issue.
III. Vaca v. Sipes: THE INCEPTION OF THE APPORTIONMENT
PRINCIPLE
Vaca involved a suit brought by an employee against his union
for the breach of its duty of fair representation. The dispute arose
as a result of the union's refusal to take the employee's grievance
through to arbitration after the employee had been permanently
discharged from his job at Swift & Company's packing house in
Kansas City. Owens, the employee, had returned to work after re-
covering from an extended illness. The company doctor had ex-
amined Owens upon his return, and had found his blood pressure
too high to allow reinstatement. Owens insisted that examinations
by outside doctors indicated otherwise, and that he was indeed fit
for work. He requested his union to initiate grievance procedures
in his behalf.5 1
After complying with Owens' request and processing the griev-
ance into the fourth step of the agreed upon procedure,62 the union
49. Id.
50. See Martucci, supra note 4, at 113-14.
51. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 174-76 (1967).
52. Id. at 175 n.3. With some variation in the number of steps, the grievance procedure
in the agreement between Swift and the union appears to have been fairly typical. As de-
scribed by Justice White:
The agreement created a five-step procedure for the handling of grievances. In
steps one and two, either the aggrieved employee or the Union's representative
presents the grievance first to Swift's department foreman, and then in writing to
the division superintendent. In step three, grievance committees of the Union and
management meet, and the company must state its position in writing to the
1984]
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arranged for yet another medical examination in order to supple-
ment its case. When the examination report offered conclusions
which failed to support Owens' position, the union's executive
board voted to suspend the grievance, and recommended to Owens
that he accept the company's "offer of referral to a rehabilitation
center.'53 Owens then brought suit against the union in a Missouri
state court, charging that the union had 'arbitrarily, capriciously
and without just or reasonable reason or cause' refused to take his
grievance with Swift to arbitration."' 5' In overturning the lower
courts' rulings that the breach of a union's duty of fair representa-
tion was arguably an unfair labor practice-and therefore within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB W-the Missouri Supreme
Court ruled that such a suit could indeed be brought in court, and
reinstated the jury verdict which the trial judge had denied
Owens.56
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine "whether
exclusive jurisdiction [lay] with the NLRB and, if not, whether the
finding of Union liability and the relief afforded Owens [were] con-
sistent with governing principles of federal labor law."5 In pursuit
of the answers to the latter question, the Court set forth a number
of significant propositions concerning the conditions under which
an employee might seek relief against his employer and his union
under section 301. When the dust finally cleared, the position of
both the employer and the union-but most notably that of the
latter-had been considerably strengthened.
Although the Court affirmed the Missouri Supreme Court's rul-
ing on concurrent jurisdiction, Justice White's opinion nevertheless
concluded that the union had not breached its duty of fair repre-
sentation. A breach of the union's duty, the Court said, was to be
measured against the standards first set forth in Steele, Tunstall
and Huffman, that is, whether the union's conduct toward the em-
ployee was arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. 8 The Missouri
Supreme Court had erroneously determined the union's liability on
Union. Step four is a meeting between Swift's general superintendent and repre-
sentatives of the National Union. If the grievance is not settled in the fourth step,
the National Union is given power to refer the grievance to a specified arbitrator.
Id.
53. Id. at 175.
54. Id. at 173.
55. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
56. Sipes v. Vaca, 397 S.W.2d 658, 666 (Mo. 1965).
57. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 174.
58. Id. at 177.
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the basis of the merits of Owens' grievance against his employer.59
Furthermore, if the proper standard had been applied, the union's
conduct in suspending Owens' grievance against his employer
would not have constituted bad faith." However, many of the
Court's pronouncements emerged in the form of dicta. Even
though Owens had not named his employer as a codefendant in the
suit against the union, the Court chose to embark on an extended
discussion of the mechanics of section 301 suits by an employee
against his employer.
Justice White, writing for a five member majority, posed a hypo-
thetical dilemma for the wrongfully discharged employee whose
union has failed to process his grievance in good faith. If the bar-
gaining agreement conferred sole power on the union to invoke ar-
bitration, and the union has wrongfully refused to process the
grievance, then the employer might attempt to raise the exhaus-
tion defense of Republic Steel against any actions brought by the
employee. 1 Such a result would, of course, be inherently unjust. As
Justice White explained:
It is true that the employer in such a situation may have done
nothing to prevent exhaustion of the exclusive contractual reme-
dies to which he agreed in the collective bargaining agreement.
But the employer has committed a wrongful discharge in breach
of that agreement, a breach which could be remedied through the
grievance process to the employee-plaintiff's benefit were it not
for the union's breach of its statutory duty of fair representation
to the employee. To leave the employee remediless in such cir-
cumstances would, in our opinion, be a great injustice.62
The remedy supplied by the Court would operate as follows:
[W]e think the wrongfully discharged employee may bring an ac-
tion against his employer in the face of a defense based on the
failure to exhaust contractual remedies, provided the employee
can prove that the union as bargaining agent breached its duty of
fair representation in its handling of the employee's grievance."
This, then, was the essence of the Vaca decision. Moreover, al-
59. Id. at 189-90.
60. Id. at 193-94.
61. Id. at 184-85.
62. Id. at 185-86.
63. Id. at 186.
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though it was couched in language which appeared to reflect a con-
cern for the employee's "remediless" circumstances, the fact never-
theless remained that, after Vaca, such an employee would not be
able to sue his employer without first proving that his union had
breached its duty of fair representation. Given the severity of the
elements of proof required of the employee to establish the union's
breach-conduct which .was arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad
faith- Vaca left the employee with some formidable obstacles to
relief.6 4
Those difficulties notwithstanding, the Court approached the is-
sue of damages in the concluding paragraphs of the opinion. Once
an employee was able to prove both his wrongful discharge by the
employer and the union's wrongful refusal to process his griev-
ance-clearly no simple task-how would liability then be appor-
tioned between the two defendants?
Justice White's appraisal of the question was greatly influenced
by his perception of the employer as the party seminally responsi-
ble for the employee's damages. Even in the face of the union's
own breach, he wrote, "there is no reason to exempt the employer
from contractual damages which he would otherwise have had to
pay."
65
Reemphasizing the employer's original responsibility for the em-
ployee's lost wages, Justice White stated:
Though the union has violated a statutory duty in failing to press
the grievance, it is the employer's unrelated breach of contract
which triggered the controversy and which caused this portion of
the employee's damages .... It could be a real hardship on the
union to pay these damages, even if the union were given a right
of indemnification against the employer. With the employee as-
sured of direct recovery from the employer, we see no merit in
requiring the union to pay the employer's share of the damages.6
Furthermore, if any doubt remained about the size of the "em-
ployer's share of the damages," it was resolved in the opinion's
final paragraph: "In this case, even if the Union had breached its
duty, all or almost all of Owens' damages would still be attributa-
ble to his allegedly wrongful discharge by Swift. 67
64. For a discussion of Vaca's burden on the individual employee, see Comment, Indi-
vidual Control Over Personal Grievances Under Vaca v. Sipes, 77 YALE L.J. 559 (1968).
65. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 196.
66. Id. at 197 (footnote omitted).
67. Id. at 198 (emphasis added).
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It would not be unfair, therefore, to say that Vaca's principle of
"apportionment" of damages was an apportionment largely in
name alone.
IV. FROM Vaca TO Bowen: INTERIM CASES
In the years between Vaca and Bowen, the Court delivered only
a handful of opinions which had any significant bearing on the de-
velopment of the apportionment principle. Three years after Vaca,
in Czosek v. O'Mara," the Court addressed the extent of the
union's liability for any "increases" the union might have caused in
the damages of a wrongfully discharged employee. The union in
Czosek had been left holding the bag, as it were, after the em-
ployee's complaint against his employer had been dismissed. The
union claimed error in the dismissal, "[a]pparently fearing that if
sued alone [it would] be forced to pay damages for which the em-
ployer [was] wholly or partly responsible."' I0
Such fears, said the Court, were groundless. Even when sued in-
dependently by a wrongfully discharged employee, the union's lia-
bility for the employee's loss of employment would be measured
only by the extent to which its refusal to process the grievance had
"added to the difficulty and expense of collecting from the em-
ployer.' 1 In short, so long as the union's breach operated indepen-
dently of the employer's act of wrongful discharge, the employer
would be exclusively liable for backpay."
The issue of backpay narrowed considerably in Justice Stewart's
concurring opinion in Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc."s The
majority held (again through Justice White) that an employee
could seek relief against his employer even in the face of an ad-
verse decision from an arbitration committee, provided the em-
ployee could prove that the decision had been "tainted" by the
union's breach of duty.
The employees in Hines had been discharged by their employer
68. 397 U.S. 25 (1970).
69. The district court had dismissed the complaint on the grounds that, under the RLA,
the employee could have processed his own grievance. Id. at 26-27. His employer was there-
fore able to successfully raise the exhaustion defense.
70. Id. at 28-29.
71. Id. at 29.
72. Id.
73. 424 U.S. 554 (1976). By the time of the Hines decision, and with the exception of
Justice O'Connor, the members of the Court who would eventually decide Bowen were fully
assembled. The gradual shift in membership since Vaca would have a critical effect on the
Bowen outcome. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
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on allegations that they had padded motel receipts during over-
night travel. 4 Maintaining their claim of innocence throughout the
grievance proceedings, the employees suggested to the union that
an investigation be made of the motel.7 The union responded
merely with "assurances that 'there was nothing to worry about'
and that they need not hire their own attorney. ' '7 ' Although it
later developed that the motel clerk may indeed have been the re-
sponsible party, the employees' discharge was upheld by the arbi-
tration committee due to the lack of any new evidence to support
the employees' claims.7 The employees then brought suit in fed-
eral court under section 301 against both their employer and their
union, claiming that the union had breached its duty of fair repre-
sentation by making no effort to verify the truth of the employer's
charges.7 '
Since the collective bargaining agreement contained a provision
which made the decision of an arbitration committee "final and
binding on all parties, ' ' 79 the issue before the Court was whether
the bar of finality could be lifted when the decision was "tainted"
by the union's breach of duty. The Court held that, just as the
union's breach of duty removed the exhaustion requirement, so,
too, would any bar of finality be lifted when the integrity of the
arbitration process was seriously undermined.80 In essence, this
meant that even when the employer relied on the decision of the
arbitrator-as he was required to do-he might still be held liable
to the employee in order to provide the employee with an "appro-
priate remedy."81
While the majority failed to elaborate on exactly how the "ap-
propriate remedy" was to be measured, Justice Stewart stated his
own recommendation quite clearly:
Liability for the intervening wage loss must fall not on the em-
ployer but on the Union. Such an apportionment of damages is
mandated by Vaca's holding that "damages attributable solely to
the employer's breach of contract should not be charged to the
union, but increases if any in those damages caused by the
74. Hines, 424 U.S. at 556.
75. Id. at 557.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 558.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 559.
80. Id. at 567.
81. Id. at 572.
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union's refusal to process the grievance should not be charged to
the employer.". . . To hold an employer liable for back wages for
the period during which he rightfully refuses to rehire discharged
employees would be to charge him with a contractual violation on
the basis of conduct precisely in accord with the dictates of the
collective agreement.2
Although similar reasoning would eventually prevail in Bowen,83
the Court nevertheless continued in the intervening years to rein-
force the rationale behind Vaca. Reiterating the concern it had ex-
pressed in Vaca over the union's ability to withstand the hardship
of certain forms of liability,84 the Court ruled in International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Foust"5 that unions could
not be held liable for punitive damages. A further obstacle to relief
from the employer was removed in Clayton v. UAW,8a when the
Court held that an employee was not required to exhaust intra-
union appeals which could neither afford him complete relief nor
reactivate his grievance. But when the Bowen majority began to
deal with the problems of precedent, it was the union's interpreta-
tions of Vaca and Czosek which presented the greatest obstacles.
In that regard, at least, the facts of Bowen arrived on something of
a silver platter.
V. Bowen v. United States Postal Service: THE RATIONAL
CLARIFICATION
Previous Supreme Court opinions, with the notable exception of
Justice Stewart's concurrence in Hines, discussed Vaca's standard
of apportionment in terms which had been anything but specific. 8 7
This failure to particularize may have been due in some part to the
complicating presence of other collateral issues which were not in-
significant in their own right. In Bowen, however, the issue of ap-
82. Id. at 573 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
83. Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983). "It would be... unjust
to require the employer to bear the increase in the damages caused by the union's wrongful
conduct." Id. at 595 (footnote omitted). Curiously, however, the Bowen majority made no
explicit mention of Justice Stewart's concurrence in Hines. But see id. at 601 n.3 (White, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
84. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 197.
85. 442 U.S. 42 (1979).
86. 451 U.S. 679 (1981).
87. See Vaca, 386 U.S. at 198 ("all or almost all" of employee's damages attributable to
employer); see also Foust, 442 U.S. at 57 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("bulk of the award will
be paid by the employer").
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portionment of damages-and that issue alone 8 -8 was squarely
before the Court.
Bowen, an employee of the United States Postal Service, had
been suspended without pay after an altercation with a coworker
in February 1976.89 As a member of the American Postal Workers
Union, Bowen filed a grievance in accordance with the terms of the
bargaining agreement.90 Despite the recommendations of the local
union officer, "the national office, for no apparent reason, refused
to take the matter to arbitration."9'1
Bowen brought suit in federal court against both the Postal Ser-
vice and the union, claiming wrongful discharge by the Postal Ser-
vice in violation of the bargaining agreement and a breach by the
union of its duty of fair representation.2 The judge instructed the
jury to apportion compensatory damages between the Postal Ser-
vice and the union in the event that both were found liable. The
judge further suggested the manner in which such damages might
be equitably apportioned: the damages accumulated before the
date at which Bowen would have been reinstated by the Postal
Service had the union arbitrated his grievance would be the re-
sponsibility of the Postal Service, and the damages accumulated
after that date would be paid by the union. 3 The jury returned the
special verdict in favor of Bowen, finding a total of $52,954 in com-
pensatory damages for lost benefits and wages.94 Based on an "ar-
88. See infra text accompanying notes 106-08.
89. Bowen, 103 S. Ct. at 590.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 591.
92. Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 470 F. Supp. 1127 (W.D. Va. 1979). Techni-
cally, Bowen's suit did not arise under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, but
rather under the Postal Reorganization Act § 1208(b), 39 U.S.C. § 1208(b) (1976). Section
1208(b) "is identical to § 301 in all relevant respects." 103 S. Ct. at 600 n.2 (White, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
93. Bowen, 103 S. Ct. at 591.
94. Id. at 592. The jury also found punitive damages against both the union and the
Postal Service in the amounts, respectively, of $10,000 and $30,000. Id. at 591 n.4. Those
awards were set aside by the trial court as against both defendants, however, since the court
felt it unfair to assess such damages against the union when the Postal Service could, and
did, raise a plea of sovereign immunity. 470 F. Supp. at 1131. Less than three weeks after
the district court's ruling in Bowen, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Foust,
442 U.S. 42 (1979), prohibiting punitive damages against unions, and the issue in Bowen was
not appealed.
Additionally, the Postal Service was directed to reinstate Bowen within 60 days of the
trial court's decision or face further liability in the amount of $125,000 for Bowen's future
loss of earnings. Attorney's fees of $20,000 were apportioned between the Postal Service and
the union in the amounts, respectively, of $15,000 and'$5,000. 470 F. Supp. at 1131. Only
the issue of backpay reached the Supreme Court.
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bitration date" of August 1977, the court ruled that the union
would be liable for $30,000 and the Postal Service for the remain-
ing $22,954.11 Both the Postal Service and the union appealed.
Citing Vaca, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court only
as to the damages award against the union, and held that liability
for backpay was the exclusive obligation of the Postal Service."
The court, however, refused to increase Bowen's award against the
Postal Service to cover the entire $52,954. Since Bowen had failed
to'cross-appeal on the damages amount against the Postal Service,
he was left with only $22,954 after the decision by the court of
appeals."'
The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision and
held instead that the union was indeed primarily liable for a por-
tion of the employee's lost wages. Justice Powell, writing for five
members of the Court,98 dismissed the union's arguments that the
employer was solely liable for backpay, and that the union itself
was "liable only for Bowen's litigation expenses." 99 Such an inter-
pretation of Vaca, the Court declared, failed to take into account
the unique nature of the relationships and interests created by the
collective bargaining agreement."'
In fact, the Court's opinion did much to alter the manner in
which those interests, particularly the union's, would be dealt with
in the future. 01 Although focusing to some extent on the "para-
95. Bowen, 103 S. Ct. at 592.
96. Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 642 F.2d 79, 82 (4th Cir. 1981).
97. Bowen, 103 S. Ct. at 592 & n.7.
98. The Bowen majority was comprised of Justices Powell, Brennan, Stevens, O'Connor
and Chief Justice Burger. A strong dissent was authored by Justice White, who was joined
by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and, in part, by Justice Rehnquist, who also filed a separate
dissent which was limited to the issue of Bowen's failure to cross-appeal the amount of
damages awarded against the Postal Service.
99. Bowen, 103 S. Ct. at 593.
100. Id. at 594.
101. In the first year following the Court's decision in Bowen, the case has been cited
primarily for one of two reasons.
First, of course, the case has taken its place as the most recent in the line of Supreme
Court decisions dealing with employee suits against both the employer and the union, and
has been referred to for the various general principles which have been developed therein.
See, e.g., DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 103 S. Ct. 2281, 2285, 2290 (1983)
(rejecting the use of state limitations periods which might otherwise circumvent employees'
recovery in § 301/fair representation cases); Kaschak v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 707 F.2d
902, 907 (6th Cir. 1983) (importance of compensating individual employees for violation of
rights); Curtis v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 716 F.2d 360, 361 (6th Cir. 1983) (quoting
DelCostello); Foster v. Bowman Transp. Co., 562 F. Supp. 806, 818 (N.D. Ala. 1983) (cited
with Foust as authority for prohibition of punitive damages against union).
Second, the new rule of apportionment has been cited not only as a guide for the alloca-
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mount importance" of the employee's "right to be made *hole,"' 2
the Court directed much of its discussion to the causal relationship
between the union's breach and the corresponding increase in the
employee's damages. Selecting quotations from Vaca, the Court
carefully assembled a line of logic that led directly to the union.
Casting the risk of understatement to the wind, the Court ac-
knowledged that Vaca had indeed placed a certain emphasis on
the employer's original responsibility for the employee's dilemma,
but that Vaca had also pointed out that the breakdown in the
grievance process would not have occurred were it not for the fault
of the union in its breach of duty.10 3 Therefore, stated Justice Pow-
ell: "The fault that justifies dropping the bar to the employee's suit
for damages also requires the union to bear some responsibility for
increases in the employee's damages resulting from its breach. To
hold otherwise would make the employer alone liable for the con-
sequences of the union's breach of duty."1'
The above quoted language, of course, might well have surfaced
in Vaca without creating so much as a ripple of surprise. One com-
mentator, for example, has suggested that the method of appor-
tionment ultimately adopted in Bowen "is required by any rational
reading of the Vaca governing principle. ' 10 5 Justice White, on the
other hand, himself the author of the Vaca opinion, found no lack
of room for disagreement on that point in his strong dissent to the
Bowen decision. But where Vaca's principle emerged as dictum,
the opinion in Bowen is informed and secured by a strong founda-
tion of fact. As mentioned earlier, this did much to ease the arrival
of the issue before the Court.
Both the employer and the union, in contrast to previous cases,
were before the Court as parties whose liability had already been
firmly established. Neither could claim that the employee had
tion of damages between employer and union, Pitts v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 700 F.2d 330, 335 n.5
(6th Cir. 1983), but also in discussions of its effect on the union's conduct as a participant in
§ 301 litigation, Lewis v. American Postal Workers Union, 561 F. Supp. 1141, 1146 (W.D.
Va. 1983) (opinion by Chief Judge Turk, author of district court decision ultimately af-
firmed in Bowen, questioning validity of certain pre-Bowen rationales concerning possible
collusion between union and employee).
102. Bowen, 103 S. Ct. at 595.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Linsey, supra note 4, at 679. As mentioned at the outset of this note, any attempt
before the Bowen decision to rely on the express language of Vaca's principle would have
been more misleading than instructive. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text. Ironi-
cally, it would seem that the original language is far more supportive of the result in Bowen
than in Vaca.
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failed to exhaust internal remedies; Bowen had apparently filed his
grievance in accordance with required procedures. The Court's
task was further simplified by the completely arbitrary manner in
which the union had refused to take Bowen's grievance to arbitra-
tion. As Justice Powell noted, the Court was not confronted with a
question of "whether there were degrees of fault."106 Indeed, the
district court had found both defendants to have acted in "reckless
and callous disregard" of Bowen's rights. 10 7 Finally, neither
Bowen's employer nor the union had induced or participated in
the other's wrongful conduct.10 8 Were that not the case, of course,
an assessment of joint liability might then have been the appropri-
ate remedy to apply.
Yet Justice White remained unconvinced, and perhaps under-
standably so, at least as far as precedent was concerned. The
weight of Vaca's rationale and its subsequent applications clearly
supported the idea of minimal liability for the union.10 9 In light of
those prior decisions, the dissent not only would have affirmed the
court of appeals as to the Postal Service's exclusive liability for
backpay, but would have increased the award against the Postal
Service to include the entire amount of Bowen's damages.1 0 It is
difficult, however, to agree completely with the spirit of the dis-
sent's contentions. Certainly Justice White's interpretation of pre-
cedent carries the highest integrity-he had, after all, authored the
opinions in Vaca, Czosek and Hines. But if Justice Powell and
others in the Bowen majority had previously joined Justice White
in those earlier opinions,' it now became clear that their decisions
in those cases, and in Hines, particularly, had been motivated by
other, more immediate, issues than the apportionment of damages.
At any rate, three members of the Bowen majority, Justices Pow-
ell, Stevens and O'Connor, had not even been on the Court at the
time of the Czosek ruling on union liability.
However, the dissent's arguments were not limited solely to the
weight of precedent. Rejecting the role of deterrence, for example,
in any consideration of union liability, the dissent emphasized the
106. Bowen, 103 S. Ct. at 599 n.19.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 595 n.11.
109. Id. at 602 (White, J., concurring and dissenting).
110. Id. at 607.
111. Justices Powell and Brennan had joined Justice White in the Hines opinion (Jus-
tice Stevens having taken no part in its consideration or decision). Of the members involved
in the Bowen decision, only Justices White and Brennan had taken part in the Court's deci-
sion in Vaca.
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risk of endangering limited union funds if the union was held lia-
ble for the "bulk" of the employee's backpay." 2 Similarly, the dis-
proportionate amount of time between the hypothetical arbitration
date and the final resolution of a court suit would subject the
union to liability "far greater than that of the employer, the extent
of which will not be in any way related to the union's comparative
culpability."' 1 3 Moreover, the dissenters were concerned that the
union was powerless to remedy the employee's dilemma-"only the
employer had the continuing ability to right the wrong and limit
liability by reinstating Bowen.""
While these criticisms are not without merit, the Bowen majority
would seem to have the benefit of the better arguments. First, even
the staunchest defender of a union's financial stability would have
to consider the other potential nonmonetary costs of maintaining
that stability in the manner suggested by the dissent. Notwith-
standing the frequently declared but nebulous goal of industrial
peace, there would still remain the question of preserving the
union's integrity in the eyes of its members. It would be difficult to
say with any certainty that holding a union liable for its portion of
backpay damages would fail to serve as a justifiable incentive for
the prompt and efficient processing of grievances. " ' Second, Jus-
tice White's concern over the disproportionate time span between
the hypothetical arbitration date and the final resolution of the
employee's suit-"the better part of a decade"-is based largely on
cases which have been taken all the way to the Supreme Court. " 6
Furthermore, the district court in Bowen had cut off the union's
liability as of the date of the jury verdict, and in fact had assessed
damages incurred after the trial against the Postal Service, which
had refused to reinstate Bowen."'
Finally, the Bowen majority was correct in its recognition that it
was dealing with much more than "a simple contract of hire gov-
erned by traditional common law principles."1 8 The dissent urged
that the employer, as the breaching party to the "contract," should
be held responsible for the total damages "even though there were
112. 103 S. Ct. at 602 (White, J., concurring and dissenting).
113. Id. at 603.
114. Id. at 604.
115. See Martucci, supra note 4, at 111.
116. Bowen, 103 S. Ct. at 603 (White, J., concurring and dissenting).
117. Bowen, 470 F. Supp. at 1129, 1131.
118. Bowen, 103 S. Ct. at 594.
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contributing factors other than his own conduct."" 9 Such a posi-
tion, of course, ignores the paramount role given the grievance pro-
cedure in the Court's previous constructions of federal labor policy.
Since the time of the Steele decision, in which the union's duty of
fair representation was first announced, the Court has held fast to
the goal of the prompt and orderly settlement of labor disputes.
The grievance procedure has consistently been acknowledged as
the preferred means of achieving that goal. Clearly, the Bowen ma-
jority viewed its decision as an incentive for the union to help fur-
ther that objective. 2 '
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's interpretation of Vaca's principle of ap-
portionment, both as it was conceived and as it was subsequently
applied, has been characterized by a marked policy of insulating
unions from liability. 2 ' Critics of the Court's methods, writing on
a theme of accountability, have emphasized the need for a deter-
mination of liability through an analysis based on causation."'2 In
its long-delayed application of a rational reading to the language of
Vaca's "governing principle," the Bowen Court has adopted pre-
cisely that rationale. The employer will no longer be held exclu-
sively liable for backpay damages in cases where the union has also
breached its duty to the employee. By holding the union responsi-
ble for those backpay damages which the employee would have
earned but for the union's breach, the Court has reaffirmed its
traditional commitment to internal grievance procedures as the
preferred means of resolving labor disputes. If the Court's analysis
is correct, its decision should act as an incentive for the union to
comply with such procedures.
It may be that the very facts which provided the Bowen Court
with such a clearly defined framework for apportionment could
easily serve to limit the application of the rationale in future
cases.' 2' The decision to hold the union responsible for its share of
119. Id. at 603 (White, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CoNmAcTs § 999 (1964)).
120. Bowen, 103 S. Ct. at 597.
121. See Martucci, supra note 4, at 112-19.
122. Id. at 119-20; see also Linsey, supra note 4, at 678.
123. Indeed, the Court concluded its opinion with a caveat in its final footnote:
We need not decide whether the District Court's instructions on apportionment of
damages were proper. The Union objected to the instructions only on the ground
that no back wages at all could be assessed against it. It did not object to the
manner of apportionment if such damages were to be assessed. Nor is it necessary
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backpay damages was delivered on a five-four vote, and that in the
face of a complete refusal by the union to even consider the em-
ployee's grievance. The extent of the Court's commitment to the
new rationale in future fact patterns-resembling, for example, the
"tainted" situation in Hines-remains to be tested. 2'
VAN CATTERTON
in this case to consider whether there were degrees of fault, as both the Service
and the Union were found to have acted in "reckless and callous disregard of
[Bowen's] rights."
Bowen, 103 S. Ct. at 599 n.19.
124. See supra note 101 for discussion of cases that have arisen since Bowen.
